

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION**

JOSEPH ROGER DESULME, :  
Petitioner, :  
vs. : CA 06-0568-BH-C

ALBERTO GONZALES, etc., :  
et al.,<sup>1</sup> :  
Respondents.

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

On September 18, 2006, Joseph Roger Desulme, a citizen and native of Haiti ordered removed from the United States, petitioned this Court for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be dismissed, without prejudice to being filed at a later date, because Desulme is no longer in the custody of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the United States Department of

---

<sup>1</sup> William Bateman is no longer the Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, David O. Streiff, is hereby substituted for Bateman as a proper respondent in this action.

Homeland Security.

### **FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. Desulme is a citizen and native of Haiti who entered the United States on December 8, 1981 and has continuously resided in this country since that date. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 9) Petitioner's status was adjusted "to that of a lawful permanent residen[t]," in April of 1990. (*Id.* at ¶ 10) Desulme was convicted of certain crimes which subjected him to removal from the United States. (*See* Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 11-13) Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on June 3, 2005. (*Id.* at ¶ 4) Petitioner's removal order to Haiti became final on February 23, 2006. (*Id.* at ¶ 12)<sup>2</sup> In his habeas petition filed on September 18, 2006, Desulme's sole argument was that his continued custody by ICE violated the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). (*See* Doc. 1, at 3-5)<sup>3</sup> As aforesaid, petitioner sought release from custody

---

<sup>2</sup> Desulme does not challenge his final order of removal. (*See id.* at ¶ 13; *see also* Doc. 1, at 7 ("Grant Petitioner a writ of Habeas Corpus directing the Respondents to immediately deport petitioner to Haiti or release him from custody."))

<sup>3</sup> In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court held that the post-removal-period detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, "read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention." 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at 2498.

pending his removal from the United States. (*Id.* at 7)

2. On November 15, 2006, Desulme was released from the custody of ICE, under certain conditions, pending his removal from the United States. (Doc. 15, Exhibit A) One release condition required that Desulme report to Metro Hospital in New York City upon his release; petitioner complied with this release condition. (*See id.*)

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. “In reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a detained alien who is subject to a final order of removal, a federal district court, pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), is to gauge whether a particular set of circumstances amounts to detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” *He v. Gonzales*, 2006 WL 1687796, \*1 (W.D. La. 2006). Where, as here, a § 2241 petitioner has been released from federal custody and thereby has garnered the relief sought in filing his habeas corpus petition the issue becomes whether there is any longer a live case or controversy or, instead, if the petition has become moot. *See id.*

2. As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” *Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS*, 296 F.3d

1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); *see also Al Najjar v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case or controversy limitation because ‘an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.’” *Soliman*, 296 F.3d at 1242.

As this Court has explained, “[p]ut another way, ‘a case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.’” Therefore, “[i]f events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” In fact, “dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional.”

*Id.* (internal citations omitted).

3. Several district courts have determined that where an alien is released from ICE custody pending removal from the United States “his petition for *habeas* relief under *Zadvydas* is moot.” *He, supra*, 2006 WL 1687796, at \*1; *see also Abdalla v. Ashcroft*, 2004 WL 2315089, \*2 (W.D. N.Y. 2004) (“As, however, Petitioner does not dispute he was released from administrative custody on January 30, 2004, the instant Petition no longer presents a case or controversy pursuant to Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution.”), *adopted by Abdalla v. Ashcroft*, 2004 WL 2491646 (W.D. N.Y. 2004).

4. This case is indistinguishable from *He* and *Abdalla*. Accordingly, this Court finds that Desulme's petition for writ of habeas corpus is now moot because there exists no active case or controversy. This Court can no longer order the federal respondents to release petitioner under an order of supervision, as requested in the petition, because Desulme has already been released from the custody of ICE. "Quite simply, 'there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.'" *Soliman, supra*, 296 F.3d at 1243, quoting *Spencer v. Kemna*, 523 U.S. 1, 18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 988, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Dismissal of the instant petition is required since mootness is jurisdictional.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> The Eleventh Circuit has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine which the undersigned does not find applicable in the instant case.

Although there is an exception to the mootness doctrine when the action being challenged by the lawsuit is capable of being repeated *and* evading review, we have held that "this exception is 'narrow,' and applies only in 'exceptional situations.'" In particular, the exception can be invoked only when "(1) there [is] a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the *same* controversy will recur involving the *same* complaining party, and (2) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration." Simply put, "[t]he remote possibility that an event might recur is not enough to overcome mootness, and even a likely recurrence is insufficient if there would be ample opportunity for review at that time."

*Soliman*, 296 F.3d at 1242-1243 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). There is simply nothing to suggest that Desulme will be placed back into the custody of ICE before ICE obtains a travel document allowing for petitioner's immediate removal from the United States and his return to his native country of Haiti. Accordingly, the foregoing exception to the mootness doctrine is inapplicable.

**CONCLUSION**

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Desulme's petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** as moot.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

**DONE** this the 12th day of December, 2006.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY  
**UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

**MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND  
RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND  
FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT**

1. ***Objection.*** Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a *de novo* determination by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); *Lewis v. Smith*, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(*en banc*). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a 'Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation' within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party's arguments that the magistrate judge's recommendation should be reviewed *de novo* and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. ***Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded)***. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE